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8532687Fiscal Equalisation:
Principles and an Application to the European Union
Abstract
The paper derives a normative model for partial fiscal equalisation based on a number of
axioms and makes special allowance for the existence of a specific fiscal need in the
jurisdictions. A simple version of this idealised equalisation scheme relates net contri-
butions to the equalisation funds to deviations of a jurisdiction’s gross income from
average gross income and a jurisdiction’s specific needs from average specific needs.
The theoretical model is then empirically tested for the case of the European Union
using data from 1986-97. It is found that most restrictions of the model appear to hold,
in particular, relatively richer countries contribute more and those with greater fiscal
needs, approximated by the importance of the agricultural sector, pay less. However, in
the EU, an adjustment of net payments to changes in the actual importance of the spe-
cific fiscal need for a country is lacking.
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I.  Introduction
Fiscal equalisation is an important aspect of the set-up of a multitude of forms of federal
government. In setting up equalisation schemes between jurisdictions within one fed-
eration, both efficiency (insurance) and redistributive goals can be achieved. In practice,
it is difficult to distinguish between those motives. A highly contested question centres
on the type of fiscal equalisation that is being perceived as fair.
Like many studies involving value judgments, this paper sets out to derive an
idealised fiscal equalisation scheme based on an explicit axiomatic foundation. Using
explicit criteria that should be fulfilled by the final equalisation scheme is a helpful way
to guide the debate. One can disagree with the axioms, but if one accepts those, one
must also accept the conclusion, which we define as fair. Consequently, we attempt to
apply only those axioms that have the potential for gathering widespread support.
A unique feature of our model is the incorporation of specific expenditures to
cope with certain needs in the member countries of the fiscal union, which allows for a
more realistic modelling of the redistribution of funds than usually employed in the
theoretical literature. Fiscal equalisation is often directed at particular disadvantages of
fiscal jurisdictions, which are beyond their immediate control. By directly including the
idea of ‘fiscal need’, we explicitly incorporate this feature of the real world. This also
makes the analysis more applicable to empirical data.
The theoretical results show that key variables for the determination of net con-
tributions are average gross income of the union and gross income of the respective
member states, as well as average gross specific expenditures and local specific expen-
ditures by the union.2
As a next step, an explicit and empirically estimable functional form is directly
derived from the theoretical model. In the empirical section of the paper, this idealised
model is applied to the European Union (EU) to test whether the theoretical considera-
tions are reflected in this example of a fiscal equalisation scheme. Since member-state
contribution to the EU is a hotly debated issue, being able to compare the actual distri-
bution of funds with an ideal scheme might facilitate a rational and educated discussion.
Sometimes redistribution within the EU is portrayed as lacking all foundations
for a fair system and as the unsatisfactory result of a power struggle between govern-
ments. We do not disagree with the statement that political power plays a role in deter-
mining many aspects of the equalisation scheme. However, we believe that simply
dismissing the solution of such negotiations as unfair is throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. As will become apparent in our empirical analysis, the EU equalisation
scheme does, to a certain extent, conform to a specific version of a fair redistribution
allowing for specific fiscal needs.
In the empirical part of the paper, we combine observations from EU member
countries over the time period 1986 to 1997 to form a panel data set of per-capita vari-
ables. First, it is tested whether the coefficients on EU average variables are equal in
absolute value to the coefficients on the member-country variables. Second, imposing
this restriction and using deviations from EU average values as regressors, it is then
analysed whether the empirical results correspond with the idealised theoretical model.
The final section contains a summary of the results and a brief policy conclusion.3
II.  Axiomatic approach towards fiscal equalisation
Fiscal equalisation
1 takes place among n jurisdictions, where  3 n ≥ . Jurisdiction i,
n , , 1 i ! = , is characterised by (non-negative) gross income  i Y , by certain (non-
negative) expenditure  i E  (= specific fiscal need), and by the (non-negative) population
i Z . Net income  i F  in jurisdiction i,  n , , 1 i ! = , depends on gross income, expenditure
and population in all n jurisdictions
(1) () n 1 n 1 n 1 i i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F F ! ! ! = , where  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F.
It is clearly natural to base fiscal equalisation on gross income and population.
However, certain expenditure could be included separately in the fiscal equalisation
scheme because of various reasons, for instance, because of external effects or an un-
even distribution across jurisdictions. However, in the context of an axiomatic approach,
a specific fiscal need should be assessed differently simply if this reflects the intention
of the entire federation.
An equalisation method is considered which, apart from other properties, isolates
each jurisdiction from certain changes in other jurisdictions.
Definition 1: An isolating partial fiscal equalisation method satisfies
2
                                                
1  The axiomatic approach towards fiscal equalization is closely related to Buhl and Pfingsten (1986,
1990, 1991). However, there exists a large strand of literature dealing with a fair distribution of funds.
See, for example, Moulin (1987) and Young (1988).
2  All properties with the exception of the first property should be fulfilled for all feasible values of
income, fiscal need and population. Only property (A1) considers special parameter values for the ju-
risdiction under consideration.4
(A1) () 0 Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F n 1 n 1 n 1 i = ! ! !  if  0 Z E Y i i i = = = ,








n 1 n 1 n 1 i E Y Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! ! ,
(A3) ( ) n j i 1 n j i 1 n j i 1 i Z , , Z , , Z , , Z , E , , E , , E , , E , Y , , Y , , Y , , Y F ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
=  ( ) n i j 1 n i j 1 n i j 1 j Z , , Z , , Z , , Z , E , , E , , E , , E , Y , , Y , , Y , , Y F ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ,
for all i, j,  n , , 1 i ! = , n , , 1 j ! = , j i ≠ ,
(A4) () ( ) n 1 n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F λ λ = ! ! ! ! ! ! ,
for all  0 > λ ,
(A5) ( ) () n 1 n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Z ~ , , Z ~ , E ~ , , E ~ , Y ~ , , Y ~ F ! ! ! ! ! ! = ,
where  k j j Y Y Y ~ + = , 0 Y ~
k = ,  m m Y Y ~ = ,
k j j E E E ~ + = , 0 E ~
k = ,  m m E E ~ = ,  k j j Z Z Z ~ + = , 0 Z ~
k = ,  m m Z Z ~ = ,
for all m,  n , , 1 m ! = , j m ≠ , k m ≠ ,
for all i, j, k,  n , , 1 i ! = , n , , 1 j ! = , n , , 1 k ! = , j i ≠ , k i ≠ , k j ≠ .#
The first three properties define a pure sharing funds method. The empty juris-
diction property (A1) says that net income in a jurisdiction without people, as well as
gross income and expenditure ought to be zero. Money should not be given to empty
jurisdictions. Property (A2) highlights total distribution of funds. The described fiscal
equalisation method is a pure sharing funds method. Thus, total income net of expendi-
ture has to be the same before and after partial equalisation. Property (A3) states ano-
nymity. The assignment of numbers to jurisdictions is irrelevant.
3
Properties (A4) and (A5) impose restrictions on funds sharing methods. Property
(A4) is homogeneity of degree zero with respect to population. Proportional population5
changes in all jurisdictions do not alter net income in any jurisdiction. Property (A5)
states independence of mergers outside the jurisdiction. This property requires that a
merger between two jurisdictions does not affect any other jurisdiction. On the one
hand, this axiom is derived from the subsidiarity principle. In principle, a merger should
be just an affair of the acting jurisdictions. On the other hand, property (A5) rules out
strategic mergers between jurisdictions to the disadvantage of outsiders. Finally, prop-
erty (A5) also ensures that rich jurisdictions are not interested in mergers of poor juris-
dictions.
4
Monotonicity of the fiscal equalisation method is required to preserve incentives
and to maintain the order of jurisdictions:
Definition 2: A monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method fulfils
(A6) () n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! !  is non-decreasing with respect to  j Y,
for all i, j,  n , , 1 i ! = , n , , 1 j ! = ,
(A7) () n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! !  is non-increasing with respect to  j E,
for all i, j,  n , , 1 i ! = ,n , , 1 j ! = ,
(A8) () n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! !  is non-decreasing with respect to  i Z,
for all i,  n , , 1 i ! = .#
Property (A6) is monotonicity with respect to gross income. Property (A7) is
monotonicity with respect to expenditure. Property (A8) is monotonicity with respect to
its own population. Properties (A6) and (A7) ensure that net income in a certain juris-
diction is not negatively affected through the specific equalisation method employed
                                                                                                                                              
3  An approach that violates anonymity is discussed by Aczél and Pfingsten (1993).6
when incomes in other jurisdictions increase and is not positively affected when fiscal
needs in other jurisdictions increase. Axiom (A8) reflects a basic condition for distribu-
tional fairness. An increase in population in one particular jurisdiction should not de-
crease the available funds for that jurisdiction.
Using these definitions, the following main result can be derived (and is proven
in the appendix).
Theorem 1: If net income functions  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F,  n , , 1 i ! = , constitute a monotonic
isolating partial fiscal equalisation method for Y > E ≥  0, i.e., if they satisfy properties
(A1) till (A8), there exist functions
() E , Y f f Y Y = , where  ℜ → ℜ +
2
Y : f,
() E , Y f f E E = , where  ℜ → ℜ +
2
E : f,
so that, for all i,  n , , 1 i ! = ,
() n 1 n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! !
() () () () ( ) () [] i E Y i E i Y z E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f 1 E E , Y f Y E , Y f − − − + − = ,
where  ∑ = =
n
1 j j Y Y,   ∑ = =
n
1 j j E E,   ∑ = =
n
1 j j i i Z Z z. #
The theorem states that a monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method
requires net income in a particular jurisdiction to depend on its own gross income, on
total income, on its own expenditure, on total expenditure and on the population share.
Moreover, the net income function is a linear function of the population share of the
jurisdiction, and the coefficient in square brackets is determined by total income and
                                                                                                                                              
4  In Germany mergers of states matter. For example, federal grants and fiscal equalisation grants from
rich states would have been reduced if Berlin and Brandenburg had merged.7
total expenditure. Very small jurisdictions will take the coefficient as given since their
own income and expenditure have only minor influence on the functions  Y f  and  E f.  A s
shown in the appendix, range requirements and monotonicity properties for differenti-
able functions  Y f  and  E f  can be imposed.
Corollary: If at () E , Y  the functions  Y f  and  E f  are differentiable,  ()1 E , Y f 0 E ≤ ≤ ,
()1 E , Y f 0 Y ≤ ≤ ,  0 Y fY ≥ ∂ ∂ ,  0 E fY ≤ ∂ ∂ ,  0 Y fE ≤ ∂ ∂ , and  0 E fE ≥ ∂ ∂  have to be
fulfilled. #
A natural monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method is described by
the next theorem:
Theorem 2: Net income functions  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F,  n , , 1 i ! = , constitute a monotonic
isolating partial fiscal equalisation method, i.e., they satisfy properties (A1) till (A8) for
Y > E ≥  0, if for all i,  n , , 1 i ! = ,
























E d 1 Y c 1 dE cY ,
where the real numbers c and d fulfil  1 d c 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ .#
Proof: Equation (2) satisfies (A1) till (A5). (A6) is guaranteed by  1 c 0 ≤ ≤ .  1 d 0 ≤ ≤
ensures (A7). (A8) is ensured by  d c ≤  since Y > E. QED
However, not only (2) is a monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method.
For instance, the following scheme also fulfils properties (A1) till (A8) (see the appen-
dix for the monotonicity properties), provided that Y > E ≥  0,








+ − = ,
where Y, E and  i z  are defined as in theorem 1.8
With respect to gross income and population, the partial equalisation method (2)
has been suggested by Buhl and Pfingsten (1991).
5 Neglecting expenditure (and also
federal funds which have been considered by Buhl and Pfingsten), a comparison of the
two approaches is worthwhile. Properties total distribution (A2), anonymity (A3), ho-
mogeneity of degree zero with respect to population (A4), independence of mergers
outside the jurisdiction (A5), and monotonicity with respect to gross income (A6) and
population (A8) are common axioms. The empty-jurisdiction property (A1) is not ex-
plicitly stated in Buhl and Pfingsten (1991). They, however, require additionally what
they call independence of the length of the equalisation method and independence of
population distribution. While the former property is formally (adapting our notation to
the case without expenditure)
(4) ( ) () n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 i Z , , Z , Y , , Y F Z , , Z , Y ˆ , , Y ˆ F ! ! ! ! +
=  ( ) n 1 n n 1 1 i Z , , Z , Y ˆ Y , , Y ˆ Y F ! ! + + ,
the latter property requires that migration between jurisdictions should not affect the
rest. Independence of the length of the equalisation method is a strong assumption
which results in the sum structure with coefficients independent of total income. Due to
this property, in the scenario described by Buhl and Pfingsten the equalisation method
(2) is not only sufficient – as stated by the previous theorem – but also necessary.
III.  Partial fiscal equalisation in the European Union
The EU is an interesting and topical testing ground for assessing the practical impor-
tance of an idealised fiscal redistribution framework. Although no explicit fiscal equali-
sation scheme exists in the European Union, only a small fraction of EU expenditures
                                                
5  See also Buhl and Pfingsten (1986, 1990).9
(roughly 8%)
6 is allocated to common purposes. This implies that the major part of EU
expenditures directly flows back into member countries. These direct flows to and from
the EU can be interpreted as reflecting a fiscal redistribution policy across member
countries.
7
An important question for the empirical analysis is the choice of an appropriate variable
to capture a specific fiscal need. The EU is a very good testing ground for this reason, as
it is relatively easy to determine the main fiscal need. In our view, this is the agricultural
sector, as expenditures on agriculture are still the most important single item in the EU
budget (51% in 1996).
The data cover the time period 1986-97 and up to 14 countries.
8 All series are in
ECU and in per-capita terms.
9 Net contributions to EU are derived by subtracting direct
EU payments to member countries from ‘own resources’ of EU by member country.
10
The importance of the agricultural sector as a special fiscal need is proxied by the ratio
of gross value added of the agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing) to overall
gross value added in market prices (AGR). Gross domestic product (GDP) is used as a
proxy for gross income.
11 Variable names with a subscript i denote values for EU mem-
ber countries and names without a subscript are average EU values.
                                                
6  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (1999), p. 3.
7  Some caveats of such an interpretation are listed in Bundesbank (1999), p. 65.
8 Luxembourg is excluded from the analysis as relevant data are missing. Some data on agricultural
shares are missing for Greece and Portugal, reducing the number of observations from 141 to 135.
9  Data are taken from various issues of Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Ausland, which is compiled by the
Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, Germany.
10 Although the EU cannot levy its own taxes to generate revenues, it nevertheless has its ‘own re-
sources’. These consist of custom duties (17% in 1996), agricultural levies (2%), value-added tax
share (48%), and GDP share (33%).
11  GNP could be considered a more appropriate income aggregate in this context. However, there are
difficulties in getting consistent data for the sample period for all countries. In any case, the correlation10
This section analyses empirically whether the implicit fiscal equalisation scheme
in the EU is in line with the ideal scheme derived in the theoretical section.
12 For that
purpose, the monotonic isolating partial fiscal equalisation method (2) with constant
coefficients will be used to derive an explicit functional form.
The net income function (2) can be written as
(5) i i i i T E Y F − − = ,
where  ()() i i i i fz E d 1 Y c 1 T + − − − =
where  () () Y c 1 E d 1 f − − − = .
i T  is the net contribution of jurisdiction i to the equalisation funds. Dividing  i T  by the
population leads to the per-capita contribution
(6) ()() g e d 1 y c 1 t i i i + − − − = ,
where  () () y c 1 e d 1 g − − − = ,
and per-capita variables are denoted by lowercase letters:
i i i Z T t = ,  i i i Z Y y = ,  i i i Z E e = ,  ∑ = =
n
1 j j Z Y y,   ∑ = =
n
1 j j Z E e.
In words, net contributions to the EU depend on gross incomes of member states, EU
income, member countries’ specific fiscal expenditures and EU specific expenditures
(all variables in per-capita). Based on (6), the following empirical model is estimated:
(7) it t 4 it 3 t 2 it 1 it AGR AGR GDP GDP     ons contributi Net  ε + β + β + β + β = ,
                                                                                                                                              
between GNP and GDP for the countries at hand is always at least 0.99 which makes them equivalent
with respect to the empirical analysis.
12  An earlier analysis by Bowles and Jones (1992) looks separately at determinants for payments to the
EU budget and EU own resources without the guidance of a specific economic model.11
with 
2
t , i t , i Var and 0 E σ = ε = ε , i country index, t time index.
Table 1 gives the results of estimating this model using ordinary least squares
(OLS). The coefficients reported in column 2 are all statistically significant using the
normal standard errors in column 3, and they display theoretically consistent signs. In
the theoretical model, coefficients (1-d) and (1-c) have to be the same for income and
expenditure on the individual and aggregate level, respectively.
13 In the empirical
model, this implies testing the restrictions  4 3 2 1 and β − = β β − = β . The last two lines of
the table report test statistics for these restrictions, and they cannot be rejected based on
‘normal’ standard errors (SEs).
Tab. 1: Testing restrictions on equation (6) (Observations: 135)
Variables Coefficients SEs Robust SEs Adjusted SEs
GDPit 0.007* (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
GDPt -0.008* (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
AGRit -37.4** (4.04) (5.2) (13.8)




Test:  2 1 β β − = F(1,131)=0.53 F(1,131)=0.36 Chi
2(1)=0.19
Test:  4 3 β β − = F(1,131)=1.27 F(1,131)=0.99 Chi
2(1)=0.81
Notes: *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level.12
However, there are potential difficulties related to the calculation of standard er-
rors. A typical problem in a panel framework is a violation of the homoscedasticity
assumption (
2
t , i Var σ = ε ), i.e. the variance is not constant over all values of the inde-
pendent variables. Column 4 presents robust standard errors based on the procedure
proposed by White (1980). The relative similarity of t-test results shows that heterosce-
dasticity is not a major problem here.
There is another issue related to deriving correct standard errors for variables
sampled at different aggregation levels (EU aggregate vs. member country). The stan-
dard errors might be downward biased (see Moulton 1990). Appropriately adjusted
standard errors are shown in the last column. Indeed, standard errors have increased but
the test for equality does still not reject. Thus in the following analysis, these restrictions
are imposed on the model to increase efficiency of the estimates.
In other words, deviations from the EU average are used as regressors in the final
analysis. The estimated restricted model is:
(8) it t it 3 t it 1 it ) AGR AGR ( ) GDP GDP (     ons contributi Net  ε + − β + − β = ,
with  it i it u ν + = ε ,
i u  unobservable individual specific effect,  it ν  remaining disturbance.
The robustness of the estimation results is investigated by making different as-
sumptions about the error term of model (8). The between-effects model (BE) uses only
the cross-sectional variation by averaging over the time dimension for each country.
OLS1 is model (7) with the restrictions on the parameters imposed, OLS2 includes a
constant, and OLS3 adds time dummies. Finally, FE is a fixed effects estimator (within-
                                                                                                                                              
13  Another restriction in the theoretical model is that c ≤  d. This will not hold in the empirical model,
though, as in the theoretical model the coefficient refers to specific expenditures, while in the empiri-13
effects estimator), which takes into account country dummies in addition to time dum-
mies.
14
Table 2 shows that the coefficient on GDPit-GDPt is estimated relatively robust
across different specifications. In accordance with the theoretical model, we get positive
estimates, most of which are significant. The results are also quite consistent across
differing empirical specifications in the case of AGRit-AGRt. In all regressions except
for FE, the effect is negative, as we would expect from the theoretical model, and highly
significant. Even after controlling for the variations in GDP, fiscal need is a powerful
determinant of fiscal equalisation flows.
Tab. 2: Explaining per-capita net contributions to EU budget





















Constant Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time effects n.a. No No Yes Yes












2 0.73 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.46
Notes: *(**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. R
2’s are not directly comparable.
                                                                                                                                              
cal model the share of agriculture in gross value added is used to proxy the specific needs.
14 See Baltagi (1995) for a discussion of different specifications for panel data models.14
However, there is a clear exception from this conclusion: the FE model.
15 After
including country fixed-effects, the sign of the coefficient changes. It is worthwhile to
investigate the source for this sign reversal in somewhat more detail to better understand
what is going on.
One can show that the parameter estimates for the country dummies are highly
correlated with AGRit-AGRt (correlation coefficient is 0.90). This indicates that the
fiscal equalisation scheme of the EU is geared towards compensating countries for a
specific fiscal need. This explains the theoretically consistent negative coefficient ob-
tained in the other model specifications. In the FE model the redistribution aspect is
captured by the country dummies, which are time invariant. After accounting for the
static redistribution captured by the dummies, the AGRit-AGRt variable picks up reverse
redistribution based on the variation across time.
We would interpret this finding as follows: the political process behind the com-
pensation of specific fiscal needs is not flexible enough to allow for a continuous ad-
justment in the equalisation scheme. Due to the nature of the bargaining game going on
between EU member countries, it is always easier to maintain the status quo than to
introduce changes (see Molle 1997).
Interpreting the empirical results within the context of our theoretical model of
fiscal equalisation allows for a better understanding of this aspect of EU redistribution.
The EU conforms to an ideal scheme of fiscal equalisation to the extent that GDP dif-
ferences matter and so do specific fiscal needs in the form of a large agricultural burden.
However, redistribution is not continuously adjusted to account for changes in actual
                                                
15 Employing a Hausman-test (Hausman 1978) leads to a rejection of a random-effects model in favour of
the FE model (Chi
2(2) = 84**).15
fiscal needs due to frictions arising from negotiations between sovereign governments
with veto power trying to protect their interests. In our view, this problem lies at the
heart of many complaints about the equity of the current system.
IV.  Summary and conclusion
Using an axiomatic approach, this paper derives a partial fiscal equalisation scheme that
not only takes income into consideration but also allows for specific fiscal needs. The
idealised theoretical model demonstrates that net contributions ought to depend on
average union gross income, member states gross income, average union specific fiscal
need, and members states specific fiscal needs. Although the proposed independence-of-
mergers-outside-the-jurisdiction axiom does not set up a Cauchy-type functional equa-
tion for income and fiscal need in all jurisdictions, the resultant functional form of the
partial fiscal equalisation mechanism is similar to the scheme developed by Buhl and
Pfingsten (1986, 1990, 1991).
As a special case of our more general partial fiscal equalisation scheme, we
derive a simple mechanism that relates net contributions to deviations of member state
values for gross income and specific fiscal need from their respective union average that
can be considered as an extension of the Buhl-Pfingsten scheme.
We apply this idealised simple mechanism of partial fiscal equalisation to the
European Union (EU), employing data from 1986 to 1997 for up to 14 countries. This is
a particularly useful testing ground, as one can compute net contributions from member
states to the EU, and it is easy to identify the main fiscal need, which is the agricultural
sector, by looking at the EU budget. In a first step, it was found that the coefficients on
aggregate EU GDP (agricultural share) and member countries’ GDP (agricultural share)16
are of equal absolute size. This restriction is then imposed on the empirical model in the
second part of the analysis.
The estimate of the effect of the deviation of individual member states GDP
from EU average on net contributions is positive. Thus, relatively richer countries pay
more to the EU than poorer countries, as demanded in the idealised theoretical model.
For the specific need proxy, the deviation of the agricultural gross value added from EU
average, we find a negative parameter in most specifications: the larger the fiscal need,
the lower net contributions. The sign gets reversed, however, in the case of a model
including country dummies. Our interpretation of this finding is that although there is
redistribution in line with the idealised theoretical model, the EU fiscal equalisation
scheme does not continuously update to changes of actual fiscal needs.
To conclude, the EU equalisation scheme does to a certain extent conform to an
idealised fiscal equalisation scheme based on a number of reasonable axioms. Hence
general complaints about the system being unfair are not warranted. Instead, our analysis
allows a more careful identification of the deficiency. It is the lack of adjustment to a
change in the relative fiscal need that prevents the system from complying with the
idealised equalisation scheme at all points in time.
In our opinion, this has a lot to do with the inability of the political process to re-
verse the status of countries from net recipient to net contributor. Perhaps it would be a
useful idea to take actual fiscal equalisation away from the political bargaining agenda
and hand it over to a more automatic system or the EU Commission. Unfortunately,
strong national interests guided by thinking in terms of keeping the status quo are likely
going to torpedo such a suggestion.17
Appendix
Proof of theorem 1
Theorem 1 will be proved step by step. From (A4) follows
() ( ) n 1 n 1 n 1 i n 1 n 1 n 1 i z , , z , E , , E , Y , , Y F Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F ! ! ! ! ! ! = .
Using (A5) repeatedly,
()
() 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
n 1 n 1 n 1 1
z 1 , 0 , , 0 , z , E E , 0 , , 0 , E , Y Y , 0 , , 0 , Y F
Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F
− − − = ! ! !
! ! !
.
can be derived. Generalising this result and taking the anonymity axiom (A3) into ac-
count, one derives the following Lemma:
Lemma 1: Net income functions  ℜ → ℜ +
n 3
i : F,  n , , 1 i ! =  satisfy properties (A3), (A4)
and (A5), only if there exists a function  ℜ → ℜ +
5 : F ~  so that for all i,  n , , 1 i ! = ,
() ( ) i i i n 1 n 1 n 1 i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ Z , , Z , E , , E , Y , , Y F = ! ! ! .#
Because of this lemma, and because of (A2) and (A5),
() ()
() () 0 , E , 0 , Y , 0 F ~ z z , E , E E , Y , Y Y F ~
z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~
j i j i j i
j j j i i i
+ + + + =
+
has to be satisfied. Using the empty-jurisdiction property (A1), the following Lemma
can be stated immediately.
Lemma 2: Net income functions  ℜ → ℜ +
5 : F ~  satisfy properties (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4)
and (A5), only if for all i, j,  n , , 1 i ! = ,  n , , 1 j ! = ,
() () ( ) j i j i j i j j j i i i z z , E , E E , Y , Y Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ + + + = + .#
Hence, the net income function F ~  is a generalised Cauchy function and a basic result
from the theory on functional equations can be applied:18
Lemma 3: Net income functions  ℜ → ℜ +
5 : F ~  satisfy properties (A1) till (A8), only if
there exist functions
() E , Y f f Y Y = , where  ℜ → ℜ +
2
Y : f,




() i i i z , E , E , Y , Y F ~
() () () () ( ) () [] i E Y i E i Y z E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f 1 E E , Y f Y E , Y f − − − + − = .
#
Proof: Starting with the previous lemma, taking monotonicity into account and applying
the basic theorem on generalised Cauchy equations [see Aczél (1966), p. 215 and Eich-
horn (1978), p. 51], yields
( )() () () i z i E i Y i i i z E , Y f E E , Y f Y E , Y f z , E , E , Y , Y F ~ + − = ,
where  ℜ → ℜ +
2
z : f . Using (A2),
( ) () () () [] E Y z E , Y f E E , Y f Y E , Y f z , E , E , Y , Y F ~
n
1 i
i z i E i Y
n
1 i
i i i − = + − = ∑ ∑
= =
() () () ( ) () E E , Y f 1 Y E , Y f 1 E , Y f E Y z − − − = ⇒ .
QED.19
Proof of the corollary
If at () E , Y  the functions  Y f  and  E f  are differentiable,
()() ( ) i Y i i
E
i i




























()() ( ) i E i i
E
i i




























Since income and fiscal need in jurisdiction i can always be chosen such that  i i Yz Y =
and  i i Ez E =  and  i z  might be arbitrarily close to zero, from (A6) and (A7) follows
()1 E , Y f 0 E ≤ ≤  and  ()1 E , Y f 0 Y ≤ ≤ . Furthermore, since  i z  and either  i Y  or  i E  can be
set equal to zero,  0 Y fY ≥ ∂ ∂ ,  0 E fY ≤ ∂ ∂ ,  0 Y fE ≤ ∂ ∂ , and  0 E fE ≥ ∂ ∂  have to be
fulfilled. QED.
Monotonicity properties of (3)




































































































































































































The term in square brackets can be written as
() () ( ) () ( ) () ∆ ∆ + − π + ∆ + − = ∆ ϕ E arctan E E arctan E arctan ,




















Hence,  0 Z F i i > ∂ ∂ .21
References
Aczél, J. (1966). Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications. Academic
Press. New York and London.
Aczél, J. and A. Pfingsten (1993). Constituent-Sensitive Public Fund Sharing. In: W.E.
Diewert, K. Spremann, F. Stehling (Eds.). Mathematical Modelling in Economics.
Springer-Verlag. Berlin, Heidelberg, New York. 3 – 10.
Baltagi, B.H. (1995). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. John Wiley. Chichester, New
York.
Bowles, R. and P. Jones (1992), Equity and the EC Budget: A Pooled Cross-Section
Time Series Analysis. Journal of European Social Policy 2. 87 – 106.
Buhl, H.U. and A. Pfingsten (1986). Eigenschaften und Verfahren für einen angemesse-
nen Länderfinanzausgleich in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Finanzarchiv N.F.
44. 98 – 109.
Buhl, H.U. and A. Pfingsten (1990). On the Distribution of Public Fund. European
Journal of Political Economy 6. 363 – 376.
Buhl, H.U. and A. Pfingsten (1991). Zehn Gebote für Finanzausgleichsverfahren und
ihre Implikationen. Wirtschaftsdienst 1991/IX. 481 – 484.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999). Monatsbericht 51(7). Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank.
Eichhorn, W. (1978). Functional Equations in Economics. Addison-Wesley. Reading,
Massachusetts.
Hausman, J.A. (1978). Specification Tests in Econometrics. Econometrica 46. 1251 –
1271.22
Molle, W. (1997). The Economics of European Integration, Ashgate. Aldershot.
Moulin, H. (1987). Equal or Proportional Division of a Surplus, and Other Methods.
International Journal of Game Theory 16. 161 – 186.
Moulton, B.R. (1990). An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate
Variables on Micro Units. Review of Economics and Statistics 72. 334 – 338.
White, H. (1980). A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a
Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity. Econometrica 48. 817 – 838.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie
(1999). Neuordnung des Finanzierungssystems der Europäischen Gemeinschaft.
Gutachten. BMWi-Dokumentation 455.
Young, H.P. (1988). Distributive Justice in Taxation. Journal of Economic Theory 44.
321 – 335.